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Contorting the Law: The Governing Statute of
Limitations in Arbitrating Medical Malpractice
Claims
INTRODUCTION
We are not insensitive to the fact that to a certain extent this
opinion can be construed as undermining the time limitations
imposed by MICRA on bringing medical malpractice lawsuits.'
In the recent case of Meyer v. Carnow, a California Court of
Appeal was asked to determine the appropriate statute of limita-
tions for commencement of court proceedings to compel arbitra-
tion.2 The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975,a
(MICRA) sets forth, among other things, a statute of limitations
for commencing medical malpractice claims in the judicial arena.4
MICRA also provides for and authorizes arbitration of medical
malpractice claims as a substitute for litigation.5 However,
1. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 175 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 n.3
(1986).
2. Id. at 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
3. "SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act." 2 Stat. 3949-4007 (1975).
4.
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider, based upon such
person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action
shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discov-
ers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,
whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal ac-
tion exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of
fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which
has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured
person.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
5.
(a) Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration
of any dispute as to professional negligence shall have such provision as the first
article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following language: "It is
understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any
medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or
were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by
submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or
resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of
arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giv-
ing up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law
before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration."
(b) Immediately before the signature line provided for the individual con-
tracting for medical services must appear the following in at least 10-point bold
red type:
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
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MICRA does not specifically embrace the issue presented in
Meyer: Where there is a written agreement to arbitrate potential
claims between a doctor and patient, does the statute of limita-
tions applicable to medical malpractice actions govern a petition
to compel arbitration, or does the statute of limitations applicable
to contracts govern? 6 The California Court of Appeals held that
the statute of limitations applicable to contracts governs a petition
to compel arbitration of a medical malpractice claim.7 The basis
for this holding was that the right to compel arbitration arose out
of a written agreement, therefore arbitration is a matter of con-
tract, and an action to compel arbitration is an action to compel
specific performance of a contract.8
This Comment argues that the statute of limitations to compel
arbitration should not exceed the statute of limitations for the un-
derlying claim. This Comment first presents the case of Meyer v.
Carnow and discusses how the court reached its conclusion. Sec-
ond, it examines the evolution of the statutes of limitations appli-
cable to tort actions generally, and medical malpractice actions
specifically; and further addresses breach of contract in the rendi-
tion of medical services and the statute of limitations applicable to
contracts and arbitration. Third, it examines the purpose of
MICRA and the problems it was designed to remedy. The short-
comings in Meyer v. Carnow and MICRA are presented and ana-
lyzed, and the possible chilling effect they may have on arbitration
"NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO
HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEU-
TRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A
JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a)-(b) (West 1982).
6. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1986). California
Code of Civil Procedure § 337 as amended in 1975 by MICRA reads as follows:
Within four years: 1. An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded
upon an instrument in writing, except as provided in section 336a of this code;
provided, that the time within which any action for a money judgment for the
balance due upon an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mort-
gage with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein was given as
security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust or mort-
gage, may be brought shall not extend beyond three months after the time of sale
under such deed of trust or mortgage. 2. An action to recover (1) upon a book
account whether consisting of one or more entries; (2) upon an account stated
based upon an account in writing, but the acknowledgment of the account stated
need not be in writing; (3) a balance due upon a mutual, open and current ac-
count, the items of which are in writing; provided however, that where an account
stated is based upon an account of one item, the time shall begin to run from the
date of said item, and where an account stated is based upon an account of more
than one item, the time shall begin to run from the date of the last item.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
7. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
8. Id. at 173-74, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
[Vol. 25
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATIONS
agreements between doctors and patients is discussed. Finally, in
concluding that relief lies in the hands of the legislature, this
Comment proposes alternative legislation as a solution to the cur-
rent state of the law.
I. Meyer v. Carnow
On April 21, 1978, petitioner, Dorothy Meyer, executed a treat-
ment and arbitration agreement9 with her podiatrist, respondent,
Dr. Jacob Carnow. On April 25, 1978, Meyer underwent surgery
on her left toe and remained under Carnow's care until June
1981.10 In January 1983 (four and one-half years from the date of
surgery), Meyer, after consulting another doctor, discovered that
the surgery and treatment rendered by Carnow were below the
standard of professional care."
Subsequently, in August of 1983, Meyer retained an attorney
who sent a letter to Carnow demanding arbitration of Meyer's
claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement. 2 In November of
1984, more than one year after the date of the demand letter,
Carnow's insurance carrier refused Meyer's demand for arbitra-
tion on the grounds that Meyer did not have a valid claim.' 3
9. The agreement provided:
In the event of any controversy between the PATIENT ... and the ATTEND-
ING PODIATRIST ... involving a claim in tort or contract the same shall be
submitted to arbitration. Within fifteen (15) days after the PATIENT or AT-
TENDING PODIATRIST shall give notice to the other of demanding arbitration
of such controversy, the parties to the controversy shall each appoint an arbitrator
and give notice of such appointment to the other. Within a reasonable amount of
time after such notices have been given the arbitrator so selected shall select a
neutral arbitrator and give notice of the selection thereof to the parties. The arbi-
trator shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time for [sic] the date of notice of
selection of neutral arbitrator. All notices or other papers required to be served
shall be served by the United States mail. Except as provided herein the arbitra-
tion shall be conducted in accordance with and governed by the provisions of Title
9 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The patient may withdraw from the
arbitration portion of this agreement within thirty (30) days from the date of this
agreement by notification of this intent to do so to the ATTENDING PODIA-
TRIST by registered mail.
Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 171-72, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
10. Id. at 172, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
11. Id.
12. The letter stated:
Demand is hereby made for Arbitration ... with respect to the medical service
treatment, and care negligently rendered by you ... [to Meyer] from on or about
April 21, 1978 to on or about July 30, 1981 .. ..
Please select an arbitrator to act on your behalf in this matter and inform us of
your choice.
Take notice that should you refuse to arbitrate this matter, [Meyer] shall take
further steps to effect arbitration according to law.
Id. at 172, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18.
13. In a footnote, the court stated: "The 15-month hiatus was caused by Dr.
1989]
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Thereafter, in December 1984, Meyer filed a petition to compel
Carnow to submit to arbitration. 4 In opposing the petition,
Carnow relied on the statute of limitations applicable to medical
malpractice claims as an affirmative defense.15 Carnow argued
that the petition to compel arbitration was untimely, thus Meyer's
claim was barred.'" The trial court agreed with Carnow's argu-
ment and denied the petition. 17
Meyer then appealed.' 8 The appellate court ruled in Meyer's
favor, holding that the right to compel arbitration arose out of the
written agreement she had with Carnow, therefore the appropriate
statute of limitations was that applicable to contracts.' 9 Because
the contract statute of limitations is four years and commences
when the right to compel arbitration arises, the petition to compel
arbitration was timely.20 Meyer's right to compel arbitration arose
when Carnow refused her demand to submit to arbitration in No-
vember of 1984,21 rendering the petition filed in December of
1984 timely and well within the four-year statute of limitations.22
In concluding its opinion, the court stated that the issue was
Carnow's investigation of the merits of Meyer's claim. We are somewhat puzzled by this as
nothing in the arbitration agreement provides for such an investigation prior to arbitration;
instead, the question of the merits of the claim would seem to be a matter for the arbitrator
to resolve." Id. at 174 n.l, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619 n.l.
14. Id. at 172, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618; see also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 which
reads as follows:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to
arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent
to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
15. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 172-73, 229 Cal Rptr. at 618. Among the basic
affirmative defenses available to medical practitioners in a medical malpractice lawsuit is
the often used running of the statute of limitations. See Comment, A Four Year Statute of
Limitations for Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiffs Case be Barred?, 2 PAC. L.J.
663 (1971). See also Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitations, 3
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 597, 604-06 (1969).
16. "Utilizing either provision of [CCP § 340.5], Dr. Carnow urged Meyer's Decem-
ber 1984 motion to compel arbitration was untimely. That is, he claimed in the alternative
that the three year limit had begun in April 1978 when Dr. Carnow performed the surgery
so that it had run in April 1981 or that the one year limit had commenced in January 1983
when another physician advised Meyer of the malpractice and it had expired in January
1984." Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
17. Id. at 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
18. Id. at 171, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
19. Id. at 173-74, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. See also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337
(West 1982).
20. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
21. Id.
22. Id. However, the real problem is that the demand for arbitration was made after
the statute of limitations had run on the medical malpractice claim.
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whether Meyer had waived her right to demand arbitration by not
asserting it earlier.23 Thus, the case was sent back to the trial
court with directions to resume proceedings in accordance with
the appellate court's view that in deciding whether Meyer waived
her right, the trial court could look to Section 340.5 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure.24
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A. Tort Claims
Until 1970, there was no California legislation that specified a
statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims.25 In 1872,
California enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 340(3) which
set forth a one-year maximum time limitation within which to
commence civil actions for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false
imprisonment.2 6 In 1905, Section 340(b) was amended to include
actions for civil negligence. However, Section 340(b) did not ad-
dress medical malpractice claims specifically.
In 1917, in Krebenios v. Lindauer,28 the California Supreme
Court construed Section 340(b) to include actions by patients
against physicians for injuries caused by the physician's negligent
or unskillful treatment.29 In Krebenios the plaintiff filed a com-
plaint against his employer ex delicto3" for an injury sustained on
June 24, 1912, and then filed an amended complaint ex con-
tractu3l on September 28, 1914, to avoid the one-year tort statute
of limitations.3 2 The defendant demurred on the grounds that the
action was in tort and not in contract, thus barred by the statute
of limitations. 3 The court held that where an employee sues his
employer for personal injuries suffered as a result of the employ-
ment, the cause of action is one in tort and not in breach of the
employment contract. 34 In support of its conclusion, the court re-
23. Id. at 175, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
24. Id.; see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
25. Comment, supra note 15, at 664.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 175 Cal. 431, 166 P. 17 (1917).
29. Comment, supra note 15, at 664 n.l 1 (citing Krebenios, 175 Cal. at 432, 166 P.
at 17-18).
30. "From a delict, tort, fault, crime, or malfeasance. In both the civil and the com-
mon law, obligations and causes of action are divided into two classes-those arising ex
contractu (out of contract) and those ex delicto. The latter are such as grow out of or are
founded upon a wrong of tort .. " BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 509 (5th ed. 1979).
31. See id.
32. Krebenios, 175 Cal. at 432, 166 P. at 17-18.
33. Id. at 431-32, 166 P. at 17-18.
34. Id. at 432, 166 P. at 18.
1989]
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lied on Gillette v. Tucker3 5 wherein it was stated that medical
malpractice claims will be regarded as ex contractu or ex delicto,
depending on the circumstances and pleadings.3 6 In Gillette, a
surgeon had negligently left a sponge in the patient's wound but
had continued to treat her thereafter.3 7 "[T]he action was brought
more than one year after the sponge was left in the wound but
within less than one year after the severance of that relation-
ship." ' However, this construction did not establish when the
cause of action arose nor when the statute of limitations began to
run. Krebenios applied a strict interpretation of the one-year tort
statute of limitations, which was followed until 1936. This meant
that a plaintiff could only bring a medical malpractice action if he
discovered the injury and brought his claim within one year from
the date of the injury."'
In 1936, the California Supreme Court set a new precedent in
Huysman v. Kirsch, ° holding that the statute of limitations did
not start running until the patient discovered the injury, thus es-
tablishing the "discovery" rule. 1 In Huysman, plaintiff sued de-
fendant for malpractice.4 On December 26, 1930, defendant ad-
vised plaintiff that surgery was necessary to properly treat and
cure a uterine tumor, at which time plaintiff employed defendant
as her physician and surgeon.4 3 The date of the injury was Janu-
ary 9, 1931, when defendant failed to remove a drainage tube
from the plaintiff's abdominal cavity." Defendant did not remove
the tube until September 26, 1932. 45 Thus, the tort was a continu-
ing one.4 6 Although the injury occurred on January 9, 1931, plain-





39. See Comment, supra note 15, at 665.
40. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
41. "[T]he statute of limitations should not run against an injured [person's] right to
compensation during the time said person was in ignorance of the cause of his disability
and could not with reasonable care and diligence ascertain such cause." Id. at 312, 57 P.2d
at 913.
42. Id. at 303, 57 P.2d at 909.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 304, 57 P.2d at 909.
45. Id.
46.
[l]f we call malpractice a tort in this case, it is a tort growing out of a breach of
contract which the law implies from the surgeon's employment and undertaking to
perform the operation .... [I]t was a continuous obligation ... and it was alive
and binding so long as the relation of physician and patient subsisted. If so, it was
the ever present duty of the surgeon to remove the sponge from the body of the
patient. It was a constant and daily obligation to use ordinary skill and care....
Neglect of this duty imposed by a continuous obligation was a continuous and
[Vol. 25
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tiff did not discover it until September 26, 1932, and it was held
that this later date, and not the former, began the running of the
one-year statute of limitations.4" This liberal interpretation and
numerous variations expanding thereon48 abrogated the effective-
ness and purpose of the statute of limitations.49
In 1970, the California Legislature passed the first medical
malpractice statute of limitations, establishing a four-year maxi-
mum time period within which to bring a claim.50 The purpose of
the 1970 statute of limitations (as with statutes of limitations in
general) was to bar stale claims and protect tortfeasors from the
threat of a lawsuit hanging in the wings for an indefinite period of
time.51 Moreover, when successfully raised as an affirmative de-
daily breach of the same, and as the facts show, caused continuous, increasing,
daily and uninterrupted injury.
Id. at 308, 57 P.2d at 911.
47. Id. at 304, 57 P.2d at 909.
48. For example, as noted in Huysman, "the courts have held that the statute does
not commence to run while the physician and patient relationship continues because the
patient usually does not have knowledge of the physician's negligence but rather the patient
continues to rely on the skill, judgment and advice of the physician." Id. at 312, 57 P.2d at
913.
49.
The cases have uniformly followed the Huysman "discovery" rule and have ex-
panded it by establishing new exceptions. Thus, the courts have held that the stat-
ute does not commence to run while the physician and patient relationship contin-
ues; or, until the plaintiff discovers the injury, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered it, whether such actual or constructive discovery
occurs prior to or after termination of the physician-patient relationship; or, if
there is an act or omission on the part of the physician which would toll or inter-
rupt the running of the statute or estop the physician from asserting that the ac-
tion is barred.
In the years subsequent to 1936, the courts have made knowledge the basis for
commencing the statutory period and have evolved on a continuing path of liberal-
ization in the interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.
Comment, supra note 15, at 666 (footnotes omitted).
50.
Section 340.5 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to read: In an action for
injury or death against a physician or surgeon ... based upon such person's al-
leged negligence, or for rendering professional services without consent, or for er-
ror, or omission in such person's practice, four years after the date of injury or one
year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. This time limitation shall be
tolled for any period during which such person has failed to disclose any act, error,
or omission upon which such action is based and which is known or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have been known to him.
Comment, supra note 15, at 668 (citing S.B. 362, Cal. Stats. 1970, c. 360, § 1, at 771.)
51. "Statutes of limitations ... in their conclusive effects are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary
on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of R.R. Tel. v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
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fense by a health care provider in a medical malpractice claim,
the statute of limitations is a complete and absolute bar to recov-
ery. 52 The statute of limitations is the most effective defense avail-
able to a health care provider. Thus, in accordance with public
policy which requires timely assertion of rights against an alleged
tortfeasor,53 this statute of limitations is intended to promote fair-
ness and certainty of medical malpractice claims because memo-
ries fade, witnesses disappear and evidence may be lost over the
passage of time.54 The difficulty in proving that the physician ex-
ercised professional skill and due care increases over time.55 More-
over, it may become impossible to determine whether the patient's
injury was in fact the result of the physician's negligence or
whether it was the result of some other cause.58
Finally, in 1975, the California Legislature passed the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act51 in response to California's
medical malpractice insurance crisis.58 Section 25 of MICRA
amended Section 340.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
and set forth a new statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims.5" In an action against a health care provider for profes-
sional negligence, the "time for the commencement of action shall
be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plain-
tiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event
shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three
52. See Note, supra note 15, at 606.
53. See id.
54. Order of R.R. Tel., 321 U.S. at 348-49.
55. Originally, to protect the perishable nature of personal injury actions, the statute
of limitations for medical malpractice suits was one year from the date of the negligent act,
not one year from the date of discovery of the injury. Note, Malpractice and the Statute of
Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528 (1957); Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
56. Note, supra note 15, at 606; Note, Malpractice, supra note 55, at 528.
57. 2 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 ch.1 § 1.
58,
This act is an urgency statute necessary for immediate preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and
shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting such necessity are:
There is a crisis in health care in California because of the inability of many
physicians and surgeons to secure malpractice insurance which may cause many of
them to leave the private practice of medicine. To help solve this problem, it is
imperative that this act take effect immediately. The Legislature finds and de-
clares that there is a major health care crisis in the State of California attributa-
ble to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in a potential break-
down of the health delivery system. ...
2 1975 Cal. Stat. 4007 ch.2 §§ II & 12.5(l)(b) (emphasis added). See also Note, Califor-
nia's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S.
CAL. L.R. 829 (1979).
59. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 25
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years beyond the actual date of injury unless tolled" by fraud,
intentional concealment, or the internal presence of a non-thera-
peutic foreign body.60
B. Contract Claims
The statute of limitations for commencing an action for breach
of contract is four years from the date of the breach.61 In addition
to tort causes of action based on medical malpractice, lawsuits
against physicians have also been based on breach of an express
contract.62 A doctor and patient are at liberty to contract for a
particular result which if not achieved gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion for breach of contract."3 A cause of action for breach of con-
tract is entirely separate from a cause of action for malpractice,
although both may arise from the same transaction.64 Moreover, it
is no defense to a breach of contract claim that the physician ac-
ted innocently or without negligence.6 5 The damages to be recov-
ered in a malpractice claim are for personal injuries, including
pain and suffering; whereas the damages for a breach of contract
claim are usually limited to expenditures made for doctors, nurses
and medicines. 6 However, in special cases, the courts may allow
damages for pain and suffering if they naturally flow from the
60. Id.
61. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
62. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 581-82, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1973);
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 67 n.1, 188 N.W.2d 601, 605 n.1 (1971) ("It is well
settled that a physician or surgeon may bind himself by express contract to perform a cure
or obtain specific results by treatment or an operation."); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich.
459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955);
Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, affid., 94 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1949).
63. Sullivan, 363 Mass. at 581-82, 296 N.E.2d at 185-86; Guilmet, 385 Mich. at 67
n.l, 188 N.W.2d at 605 n.1; Stewart, 349 Mich. at 467-68, 84 N.W.2d at 822-23; Robins,
308 N.Y at 546, 127 N.E.2d at 331; Colvin, 276 App. Div. at 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 795,
affd., 94 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1949).
64. "[T]his cause of action (in contract) is entirely separate from malpractice, even
though they both, as here, may arise out of the same transaction .... The two causes of
action are dissimilar as to theory, proof and damages recoverable. Malpractice is predi-
cated upon the failure to exercise requisite medical skill and is tortious in nature. The
action in contract is based upon a failure to perform a special agreement. Negligence, the
basis of the one, is foreign to the other." Stewart, 349 Mich. at 468, 84 N.W.2d at 823
(quoting Colvin, 276 App. Div. 2d at 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 795).
65. "[l]t is hardly a defense to a breach of contract that the promisor acted inno-
cently and without negligence." Sullivan, 363 Mass. at 584, 296 N.E.2d at 187. "If a
doctor makes a contract to effect a cure and fails to do so, he is liable for breach of con-
tract even though he use [sic] the highest possible professional skill." Robins, 308 N.Y. at
547, 127 N.E.2d at 332.
66. "The damages recoverable in malpractice are for personal injuries, including the
pain and suffering which naturally flow from the tortious act. In the contract action they
are restricted to the payments made and to the expenditures for nurses and medicines or
other damages that flow from the breach thereof." Stewart, 349 Mich. at 468, 84 N.W.2d
at 823 (quoting Colvin, 276 App. Div. 2d at 10, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 795).
1989]
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breach of contract.6 7
C. Petitions to Compel Arbitration
When a doctor and patient sign a contract agreeing to arbitrate
claims that may arise out of the physician-patient relationship, the
statute of limitations for a petition to compel arbitration is that
applicable to contracts, 6  not that applicable to medical malprac-
tice claims.09 Upon the physician's refusal to submit to arbitration
at the demand of the allegedly injured patient, the patient may,
within four years from the date of the doctor's refusal, petition the
court to compel arbitration.7 0 The court itself does not have juris-
diction over the merits of the claim for medical malpractice. It
merely has jurisdiction over the issue of breach of contract.7 1
67. In Stewart v. Rudner, a 37 year-old woman contracted with her physician to
perform a Caesarean section to deliver her baby. Because the woman had previously suf-
fered two miscarriages and because of her age, she felt that a Caesarean section was abso-
lutely necessary so as to avoid the "hazards of a normal delivery." The physician testified,
"I knew Mrs. Stewart wanted a Caesarean. I knew also of the possible problems in the
delivery of this child."
In June, the physician recommended that plaintiff have x-rays taken, at which time the
baby was eight months in development. In September, plaintiff believed that she was long
overdue because the baby would have come to full term in July. On the evening of Septem-
ber 4th, plaintiff began to have labor pains and entered the hospital. At that time fetal
heart tones were heard, but by the early morning hours of September 5th, no fetal heart
tones were heard. The physician told the head doctor of obstetrics to handle the case but
failed to inform him about the Caesarean section. Consequently, after examining plaintiff
and hearing no fetal heartbeat he performed an episiotomy to facilitate delivery of the dead
fetus.
Thereafter, plaintiff sued both her physician and the delivering physician for breach of
contract. The court found that the parties indeed had a contract for the Caesarean. As for
damages, the general rule is that damages for mental suffering are not recoverable in con-
tract situations, but where as here the contract is concerned with life and death and mental
solicitude the parties may reasonably be said to have contracted with reference to the pay-
ment of damages for pain and suffering therefor in the event of breach. Stewart, 349 Mich.
at 460-66, 468-73, 84 N.W.2d at 819-21, 823-25.
68. "[T]he applicable statute of limitations is the one governing actions on a written
contract.... [B]ecause the party's right to arbitrate arose out of a contract... [the] Code
of Civil Procedure section 337, which establishes a four year statute of limitations for ac-
tions upon 'any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing,'
should apply." Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618
(1986).
69.
[R]eliance upon the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice law-
suits is misplaced. Meyer is not seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a judicial
forum to litigate the merits of a malpractice claim but rather seeks from the supe-
rior court an order that Dr. Carnow abide by a contract he signed. The statute of
limitations applicable to a judicial action to compel arbitration should not be de-
pendent on how the claim for which arbitration is sought is characterized.
Id. at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
70. "[T]he contract statute of limitations does not commence until the cause of ac-
tion to compel arbitration arises and that such right does not accrue until there has been a
demand to arbitrate and a refusal to submit to arbitration." Id.
71. The right to petition the court to compel arbitration is a cause of action that
10
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Therefore, because the action is one for breach of contract, the
statute of limitations for compelling arbitration is that applicable
to contracts and not that applicable to the underlying substantive
claim, e.g., medical malpractice.
Petitioning the court to compel arbitration is, in essence, an ac-
tion for specific performance of the terms of the contract.7 2 The
court hearing the petition does not settle the substantive merits of
the underlying dispute for which the arbitration is sought;7 3 and
"an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the
ground that the petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit. 74
The court will deny a petition to compel arbitration" only upon
proof of waiver of the right to demand arbitration by the peti-
tioner, upon grounds for revocation of the agreement, or where
there is an unreasonable delay in demanding arbitration.76 Indeed,
in deciding whether the petitioner has commenced a timely action
to compel arbitration:
[T]he superior court can, by analogy, look to the provisions of
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 to the extent the statute
demonstrates the Legislature's determination of what, given its
concern about a major statewide health crisis, is a reasonable
time in which to file a lawsuit based upon a claim of medical
malpractice.7
7
However, "[w]here an arbitration agreement does not specify a
arises out of the breach of contract. The breach of contract occurs when one party to the
arbitration agreement refuses the other party's demand to submit to arbitration. So, too,
the statute of limitations applicable to contracts commences when the cause of action
arises. Id.
72. La Pietra v. Freed, 87 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 1030, 151 Cal. Rptr. 554, 556 (1978).
73. The court in Meyer stated: "Indeed, the language of the arbitration clause at
bench makes clear that its provisions apply either to a tort claim (e.g., malpractice) or to a
contract claim (e.g., an action for money for services rendered) arising out of the doctor-
patient relationship. Hence, utilizing the four-year period found in Code of Civil Procedure
section 337 will ensure consistency of decision in regard to judicial enforcement of promises
to arbitrate." Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
74. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1821.2 (West 1982). In A.D. Hoppe Co. v. Fred Katz
Constr. Co., although there was a high probability that no substantive controversy existed,
"under the California Arbitration Act the courts of this state are not permitted to refuse
arbitration on the ground that the contentions of the party seeking arbitration lack substan-
tive merit." 249 Cal. App. 2d 154, 162, 57 Cal. Rptr. 95, 99 (1967).
75. "[T]he court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the contro-
versy ... unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by
the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement." CAL CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
76. The California courts have found waiver of the right to demand arbitration
where the petitioner has taken steps inconsistent with his intent to invoke arbitration;
where the petitioner has acted in bad faith or engaged in willful misconduct; or where the
petitioner has unreasonably delayed in demanding arbitration. Davis v. Blue Cross of N.
Cal., 25 Cal. 3d 418, 425-26, 600 P.2d 1060, 1064, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828, 832 (1979) (and
cases cited therein).
77. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal App. 3d 169, 175, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1986).
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time within which arbitration must be demanded, a reasonable
time is allowed, and what constitutes a reasonable time is a ques-
tion of fact, depending upon the situation of the parties, the na-
ture of the transaction, and the facts of the particular case."1 8
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE CURRENT
INTERPRETATION
A. Meyer v. Carnow Does Not Support the Proposition That
the Four-Year Contract Statute of Limitations Governs the
Underlying Medical Malpractice Claim In Contractual
Arbitration
In response to the statewide health care insurance crisis, the
California Legislature enacted MICRA, providing, among other
things, a statute of limitations specifically addressed to litigation
of medical malpractice claims.79 However, MICRA may have
fallen short by failing to provide a statute of limitations for the
arbitration of medical malpractice claims.80 The result has been to
contort8 the law. Not only has the law been twisted out of
shape,82 it has been twisted and bent upon itself.83 The law of con-
tracts and the law of torts are in conflict with one another and
have been unnaturally and unnecessarily commingled in the
sphere of medical malpractice.
The statute of limitations is necessary to promote fairness and
certainty in litigating medical malpractice claims.84 Whether liti-
gating or arbitrating a medical malpractice claim, the problems
encountered with evidence, witnesses and proof of professional
negligence over the passage of time are the same-witnesses dis-
appear, evidence is lost, and memories fade.85 To have two stat-
utes of limitations when arbitrating a medical malpractice claim
only contorts the matter.
78. Id. at 175, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (quoting Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 64
Cal. 2d 833, 836, 415 P.2d 816, 817, 52 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1966)).
79. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
80. MICRA merely approves arbitration as a substitute for litigation of medical
malpractice claims. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
81. The word "contort" has a two-fold meaning in this Comment. First, as an acro-
nym it refers to the commingling of contract and tort law. Thus, taking "con" from con-
tract and adding to it the word "tort" we get the acronym "contort." Second, as aptly
defined in the dictionary it means "[t]o twist, wrench, or bend severely out of shape.... To
become twisted into a strained shape or expression .... To twist together .... Twisted or
strained out of shape.... Twisted or bent upon itself." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 289 (6th ed. 1976).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Although the patient and physician give up their constitutional
right to a trial by jury when they contract to arbitrate their poten-
tial claims a6 they are not waiving the same claims or affirmative
defenses that they could otherwise raise in a court of law.a1 In-
deed, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
1295(a),8 a arbitration is a substitute for litigation, and to hold
that a claim which would be barred in court by the statute of
limitations is not barred in arbitration would be in abrogation of
the purpose of arbitration-to resolve disputes quickly and
cheaply, but to resolve them nonetheless.8 9 Moreover, any such
holding would discourage arbitration due to uncertainty of the ap-
plicable law to the underlying claim." Because arbitration is a
substitute for litigation, the claims and defenses that may be as-
serted in a court of law may also be asserted in arbitration. 91
Thus, the affirmative defense that the medical malpractice statute
of limitations has run, which may be asserted in a court of law,
may also be asserted in arbitration.92
Meyer is limited to holding that the four-year contract statute
of limitations governs a petition to compel arbitration of a medical
malpractice claim.93 This holding does not extend the statute of
86. "Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitu-
tional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead
are accepting the use of arbitration." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
87. "To conclude arbitration is not an action for purposes of Civil Code section 3294
[punitive damages] would be in disregard of another purpose of arbitration. Arbitration
serves as the substitute for proceedings in court. As a substitute, arbitration would not be
encouraged by a decision which effectively holds that claims which may otherwise be as-
serted in a court of law may not be asserted in arbitration." Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App.
3d 618, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 684 (1984).
88. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
89. "One of the primary objectives of arbitration is to effect the expeditious and
economical solution of disputes." Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
"California has a public policy of a long standing nature in favor of arbitration over litiga-
tion as a method to settle disputes because it is expeditious, inexpensive, avoids the delays
of litigation, and relieves overburdened courts. This policy favoring arbitration extends to
its use in settlement of medical malpractice claims." Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d
169, 173-74, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618 (1986) (citations omitted).
90. In 1984 a California Court of Appeal was called upon to determine whether
punitive damages could be awarded pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 in an
arbitration proceeding based upon medical malpractice. The court concluded that in a
court proceeding for medical malpractice, compensatory and general damages for negli-
gence as well as punitive damages may be recovered upon proof that the defendant is guilty
of malice, either express or implied. Therefore, the court held that because punitive dam-
ages may be asserted in a court of law, they may also be asserted in arbitration. Baker, 162
Cal. App. 3d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
91. "Punitive damages which may be asserted in a court of law may also be asserted
under the arbitration clause in question. . . As a substitute, arbitration would not be
encouraged by a decision which effectively holds a claim which may otherwise be asserted
in a court of law may not be asserted in arbitration." Id. at 627-28, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
92. Id.
93. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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limitations governing the underlying medical malpractice claim to
four years. Any such inference would contravene the time limita-
tions that are prescribed by MICRA for the medical malpractice
claim itself regardless of whether it is resolved in litigation or ar-
bitration. 4 Indeed, the Meyer decision may have no effect at all
other than to set precedent for granting petitions to compel arbi-
tration of claims which might otherwise be barred by the statute
of limitations applicable to the underlying medical malpractice
claim. As a result, time and money will be unnecessarily expended
in petitioning the court to compel arbitration and defending
against the petition. Moreover, the court's time will be needlessly
wasted in hearing petitions to compel arbitration of claims without
merit because the statute of limitations has run on the underlying
claim. This does not relieve court congestion.
When the California Legislature enacted MICRA, it did so em-
bracing four major concerns: time limitations,95 damages,9 6 attor-
ney's fees, and arbitration.97 Both the amended statute of limita-
tions and the approval of arbitration as a favored and
constitutional means of settling disputes were intended to remedy
the health care crisis. 8 The statute of limitations reduces the
length of time in which a medical malpractice action can be
brought, thereby reducing the number of potential claims. More-
over, arbitration, as an alternative to litigation, reduces the cost of
settling medical malpractice disputes by eliminating the costly
formalities of in-court litigation. 9
However, MICRA may have fallen short with respect to time
limitations and arbitration. The problem is that an agreement to
94, CAL. CIv. PROC, CODE § 340.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
95. Id.
96. A report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice released by
Health Secretary Otis Bowen stated that the number of malpractice claims filed against
physicians and the size of jury awards started going up at an unprecedented rate beginning
in the late 1960s. The report also stated that changes in state tort laws passed in the mid-
1970s are having some beneficial effect and that state tort laws could reduce insurance
premiums if fair and reasonable limits are placed on malpractice damage awards. San
Diego Union, Aug. 8, 1987, at A-26, col. 1.
97. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
98.
(b) The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in
the State of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs
and resulting in a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hard-
ships for the medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal,
and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health
care available to citizens of this state. The Legislature, acting within the scope of
its police powers, finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide
an adequate and reasonable remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public
health and safety considerations permit now and into the foreseeable future.
2 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 ch.2, § 12.5(1)(b).
99. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618 (1986).
[Vol. 25
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arbitrate is a contract wherein "[b]oth parties to this contract, by
entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have
any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and in-
stead are accepting the use of arbitration." ' It is breach of this
contract, i.e., refusing the demand to arbitrate, not an injury due
to medical malpractice, that gives rise to a cause of action to peti-
tion the court to compel arbitration.10' Thus, a patient could de-
mand arbitration long after the medical malpractice statute of
limitations has run. Notwithstanding, when the respondent refuses
the demand because the statute has run on the underlying claim,
the petitioning party has four years from the date of refusal to
petition the court to compel arbitration." 2 If the court determines
that a written agreement to arbitrate does exist, it must order the
parties to arbitrate regardless of the underlying substantive mer-
its.0 3 The parties then enter arbitration to resolve the substantive
merits of the dispute for which arbitration was sought in the first
place. However, the statute of limitations is a special defense and
one that does not involve the merits.0 4 Therefore, it would seem
that the Meyer court not only could have, but should have looked
to the statute of limitations on the underlying claim.
B. The Paradox: Litigation vs. Arbitration
1. Litigation of a Medical Malpractice Claim-In'its simplest
form, the first hurdle to get over in bringing a medical malprac-
tice action is the statute of limitations. 10 5 Indeed, if the answer to
100. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982).
101.
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to
arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the con-
troversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has
been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agree-
ment. (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court
action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction
or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
102. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
103. "If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy
exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that the
petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West
1982).
104. "When the answer pleads that the action is barred by the statute of limitations
• ..or sets up any other defense not involving the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action
but constituting a bar . . . the court may . . . proceed to trial of the special defense or
defenses before the trial of any other issue in the case .. " CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 597
(West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
105. Not only is the statute of limitations an affirmative defense to be plead in the
1989]
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a complaint against a physician for alleged medical malpractice
pleads that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, then
that issue must be tried separately and before any other issues in
the case are tried.106 If the statute has run, there is no need to
resolve the substantive issues and prove the elements of the medi-
cal malpractice claim because the patient is barred from bringing
the action.107 If the statute of limitations has not run, the substan-
tive issues of the medical malpractice claim will be tried to deter-
mine the outcome of the case.1 08
2. Arbitration of a Medical Malpractice Claim-In its simplest
form (setting aside the issue of waiver), the first hurdle to get over
in petitioning the court to compel arbitration of a medical mal-
practice claim is the statute of limitations applicable to contracts.
If the petition is brought more than four years after the right'09 to
petition has accrued, the court will refuse to order arbitration and
the matter will end there. If, however, the petition is brought
within four years, the court will grant specific performance of the
contract by ordering the parties to arbitrate.
With respect to waiver, the court could use the same bifurcated
procedure it would use in litigation pursuant to Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 597.5. Before ordering arbitration, it could first re-
solve the statute of limitations issue. Upon petitioning the court to
compel arbitration, the first hurdle to overcome would be the con-
tract statute of limitations. If the petition is timely in this respect,
the second hurdle to overcome would be the medical malpractice
statute of limitations. If the statute has run on the underlying
claim, the court could deny the petition on one of two grounds:
One, that the underlying claim is simply barred by the medical
answer, but it is also characterized as a special defense not involving the merits. Id.
106. "In an action against a physician or surgeon . . . based upon such person's
alleged professional negligence . . if the answer pleads that the action is barred by the
statute of limitations and if any party so moves or the court upon its own motion requires,
the issues raised thereby must be tried separately and before any other issues in the case
are tried." CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 597.5 (West Supp. 1988).
107. "[l]f the decision of the court, or the verdict of the jury, upon any special de-
fense so tried ... is in favor of the defendant pleading the same, judgment for the defend-
ant shall thereupon be entered and no trial of other issues in the action shall be had ..
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1988).
108. "If the issued raised by the statute of limitations is finally determined in favor
of the plaintiff, the remaining issues shall then be tried." CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 597.5
(West Supp. 1988).
109. Without even looking at the issue of waiver, it would seem that no "right" even
exists if the demand is made after the statute of limitations has run on the underlying
claim. The arbitration agreement becomes void after the underlying claim becomes moot
because the statute of limitations has already run. Thus, because there is no "right" to
demand arbitration in the first place, there could never be a "right" to compel arbitration
when that demand is refused.
[Vol. 25
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malpractice statute of limitations; the other, that the petitioner
has waived the right to demand arbitration by unreasonable delay
in demanding arbitration because the malpractice statute of limi-
tations has run."10
The petition to compel arbitration has no relation to the under-
lying medical malpractice claim."' Therefore, as the law stands
according to the Meyer court, if the petition to compel arbitration
is filed after the medical malpractice statute of limitations has
run, but within four years from the time the right to so petition
accrues, the court must grant the order to arbitrate because it
may not deny the order on the grounds that the underlying claim
lacks substantive merit." 2 However, if the court were to deny the
petition on the grounds that the statute of limitations has run on
the underlying claim, it would not be denying it for lack of sub-
stantive merit because the statute of limitations has nothing to do
with the substantive merits of the claim."13
In light of the foregoing it must be remembered that it is not
specific performance of the arbitration agreement that is of ulti-
mate importance to the parties, but rather the underlying claim
for which arbitration is sought. Winning the petition to compel
arbitration has no meaning unless the underlying claim is still
fresh. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice is a spe-
cial affirmative defense and one that may be validly raised in arbi-
tration.114 Thus, if the statute of limitations has run on the under-
lying claim, the order compelling arbitration is a naked victory.
Speaking in terms of pure logic, in order for the petitioner to have
any success in arbitration, he must at least demand arbitration
within the time prescribed by the shorter statute of limitations ap-
plicable to medical malpractice. If not, the physician will raise the
affirmative defense that the claim is barred and the patient will
110. "In deciding whether [petitioner] has acted in a timely fashion, the superior
court can, by analogy, look to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 to the
extent the statute demonstrates the Legislature's determination of what, given its concern
about a major statewide health crisis, is a reasonable time in which to file a lawsuit based
upon a claim of medical malpractice." Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 175, 229
Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1986). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(a) (West 1982).
111. In 1967 a California Court of Appeal held that it "was improper for the trial
court to base its order denying defendant's petition to compel arbitration under building
construction contracts on the ground that defendant's contention lacked substantive merit,
even though a strong probability that no controversy actually existed between the parties
was indicated by the facts . . . and that defendant raised the arbitration issue without
specifying what the arbitrable controversy was." A.D. Hoppe v. Fred Katz Constr. Co.,
249 Cal. App. 2d 154, 57 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1967).
112. Id. at 162, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
113. The statute of limitations is a special defense not involving the merits. CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1988).
114. Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1984).
1989]
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lose the claim.11 5
C. A Comparative Analysis of Three Hypothetical Scenarios:
The Number of Steps it Takes to Conclude That the Claim for
Medical Malpractice is Barred by the Statute of Limitations
1. Bifurcated Litigation
STEP 1: Plaintiff files a complaint for medical malpractice.
STEP 2: Defendant files an answer and pleads as a special de-
fense that the action is barred by the medical malpractice statute
of limitations." 6
STEP 3: The case is bifurcated pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure section 597.5.11
STEP 4: The court tries the issue regarding the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations separately, before any other is-
sues."1 8 If it finds that the statute has run, thus barring the claim,
the matter is at an end and there is no need to try the case on the
substantive merits." 9
STEP 5: If the court finds that the statute has not run, it goes on
to try the remaining substantive issues upon which a verdict will
be rendered. 20
RESULT: It takes only four steps in bifurcated litigation to de-
termine whether the claim for medical malpractice is barred by
the statute of limitations.
2. Arbitration using the Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations
STEP 1: Petitioner demands arbitration of a medical malprac-
tice claim after the statute of limitations has run on the claim.' 2 '
STEP 2: Respondent refuses to submit to arbitration on the
grounds that the statute of limitations has run on the underlying
claim 22 and therefore petitioner no longer has the "right" to de-
mand arbitration.
STEP 3: Petitioner files a petition to compel arbitration of the
medical malpractice claim.' 23
STEP 4: Respondent files a response opposing the petition on the
115. Id.
116. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 597.5 (West Supp. 1988).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1988).
120. Id.
121. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
122. Id.
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
[Vol. 25
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grounds that the statute of limitations on the underlying medical
malpractice claim has run.
STEP 5: Assuming there is no dispute as to the contract statute
of limitations,'2 4 i.e., the petition to compel arbitration was filed
within the statutory time, the court then tries the issue regarding
the statute of limitations on the underlying claim. 2 If the statute
has run, the case ends and the court refuses to order
arbitration.126
STEP 6: If the statute of limitations has not run, the court goes
on to order arbitration. The parties enter arbitration and resolve
the substantive merits.
RESULT: It takes five steps using the statute of limitations as a
special defense to determine that the claim is barred, compared to
the four steps it takes to bifurcate and try the same issue in litiga-
tion. This is only one step more than in the procedure bifurcating
litigation of the same claim.
3. Arbitration Without Using the Medical Malpractice Statute
of Limitations
STEP 1: Petitioner demands arbitration of a medical malprac-
tice claim after the statute of limitations has run on the claim.127
STEP 2: Respondent refuses the demand for arbitration on the
grounds that the statute of limitations has run on the underlying
claim"2 " and that therefore petitioner no longer has the "right" to
demand arbitration.
STEP 3: Petitioner files a petition to compel arbitration of the
medical malpractice claim.129
STEP 4: Respondent files a response opposing the petition on the
grounds that the medical malpractice statute of limitations has
run, thus barring the claim.
STEP 5: The court determines that because the petition was
timely filed, i.e., within the time permitted under the contract
statute of limitations, 3 " it must order the parties to arbitrate
without regard to the statute of limitations on the underlying
claim.' 3'
STEP 6: In arbitration, respondent again argues that the medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations has run, thus barring the
124. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 597.5 (West Supp. 1988).
126. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1988).
127. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
128. Id.
129. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
130. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
131. CAL. CV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
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claim.
STEP 7: The arbitration proceeding is bifurcated pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 597.5.
STEP 8: The arbitrator hears the issue regarding the medical
malpractice statute of limitations. If the arbitrator determines
that the statute has run, the case ends here.132
STEP 9: If the arbitrator determines that the statute has not
run, the substantive issues of the claim are heard and a decision is
rendered.133
RESULT: It takes eight steps to determine that the case was
barred by the statute of limitations compared to the four steps it
takes in litigation and the five steps it takes in determining
whether to order arbitration using the underlying claim's statute
of limitations. This makes the present state of the law the least
desirable avenue of dispute resolution where the statute of limita-
tions on the medical malpractice claim is in issue.
Each step costs money and takes time which unnecessarily in-
creases with each step. This does not reduce court congestion or
the cost of suit. It takes the court the same number of steps and
the same amount of time, if not less, to determine that the under-
lying claim is barred by the statute of limitations as to determine
waiver of the right to demand arbitration based upon an unrea-
sonable delay in that the underlying statute of limitations has run.
However, what is interesting is that the petitioner who demands
arbitration after the statute of limitations has run on the underly-
ing claim has not "waived" the right to demand by unreasonably
delaying the demand, but rather the petitioner no longer has the
right to waive. The right evaporated when the statute ran. There-
fore, following this logic, the court need not consider the issue of
waiver.
If the courts were permitted to follow the steps outlined in part
2 above, it would discourage parties from needlessly filing peti-
tions to compel arbitration and wasting court time on claims that
are ultimately barred. Otherwise, parties may feel that it is worth
their own time and money to get the petition filed and arbitration
ordered, even though the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions has run, in the hopes that the arbitrator will hear the sub-
stantive issues regardless of the statute of limitations and find for
the petitioner. The reason is that an arbitration award cannot
later be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator committed an
error in law or fact.13 4
132. CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1988).
133. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 597.5 (West Supp. 1988).
134. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
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D. To Determine Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration,
the Court May Look to the Statute of Limitations on the
Underlying Medical Malpractice Claim
Although the court is forbidden from denying an order compel-
ling arbitration on the grounds that the underlying claim lacks
substantive merit,135 it may do so on the grounds that the party
seeking the order has waived his or her right to arbitration.36
Among those factors which constitute waiver, the most important
with respect to the statute of limitations, is when the party has
"unreasonably" delayed the demand to arbitrate.37 Absent lan-
guage in the arbitration agreement specifying a reasonable time
within which arbitration must be demanded, the issue of reasona-
ble time becomes an issue of fact for the trial court that is consid-
ering the petition to compel arbitration. 38 This is where waiver
becomes important: In determining whether the petitioner de-
manded arbitration within a reasonable time, the court can look to
the statute of limitations on the underlying claim 39 "to the extent
the statute demonstrates the legislature's determination of what..
is a reasonable time in which to file a lawsuit based on a claim of
medical malpractice."40
Therefore, the arbitration agreement should state specifically
what is a reasonable time in which either party may demand arbi-
tration. As applied to the patient, a reasonable time would be no
less than that provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5
(the statute of limitations for medical malpractice). Thus, the pa-
tient would have to demand arbitration within three years from
the date of injury. If the patient waits longer than three years
from the date of injury, the doctor could raise the argument in
court that the patient waived the right to compel arbitration as
specified in the agreement itself. Upon this showing of waiver, the
court will deny the order to compel arbitration. However, if the
doctor fails to provide a specific time, he will have to hope that the
135. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
136. "Civil Procedure section 1281.2 permits a trial court to deny the request if the
party seeking arbitration has waived its right thereto." Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d
169, 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619 (1986).
137. "The courts have found waiver of the right to demand arbitration in the follow-
ing situations: (1) when a party has unreasonably delayed in commencing proceedings to
compel arbitration; (2) when the party seeking arbitration has previously acted inconsis-
tently with an intent to invoke arbitration; and (3) when a party has acted in bad faith or
engaged in willful misconduct." Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 175 n.2, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619
(citing Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern California, 25 Cal. 3d 418, 600 P.2d 1060, 158
Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) and cases cited therein).





Solito: Contorting the Law:  The Governing Statute of Limitations in Arbi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
court hearing the petition concludes that a reasonable time within
which to demand arbitration is per se the time required by the
medical malpractice statute of limitations.
The problem with relying on the court to find waiver is that if
arbitration is ordered, and if the arbitrator proceeds to resolve the
claim even though it is otherwise barred by the medical malprac-
tice statute of limitations, the award cannot later be vacated on
the grounds that the arbitrator committed an error in law or
fact. 141
An unlikely alternative would be to disregard the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations entirely once the claim is brought to
arbitration so long as the petition to compel arbitration is timely
filed. However, this would undermine, if not abrogate, the purpose
of MICRA and render meaningless the public policy favoring ar-
bitration as an inexpensive alternative to litigation.
Arbitration is important only to the extent that (1) it is a fa-
vored alternative to litigation because it tends to reduce court con-
gestion and eliminate the costly formalities of litigation; 142 and (2)
both parties to an arbitration agreement give up their constitu-
tional rights to have their claims heard in a court of law and by a
jury.143 However, it must be remembered that it is not arbitration
in and of itself that the parties are ultimately concerned with. It is
the underlying claim to be arbitrated that is of ultimate impor-
tance. Whether the arena for resolution of disputes is in the for-
mal setting of a court of law or in the informal setting of a confer-
ence room, the underlying claim should be determinative of the
applicable statute of limitations. 4 Otherwise, considering the po-
141. The sole grounds for vacating an arbitration award are set forth in Code of
Civil Procedure section 1286.2 which reads as follows:
[T]he court shall vacate the award if the court determines that: (a) The award
was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b) There was corrup-
tion in any of the arbitrators; (c) The rights of such party were substantially
prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrators; (d) The arbitrators exceed their
powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the deci-
sion upon the controversy submitted; or (e) The rights of such party were substan-
tially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear
evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators con-
trary to the provisions of this title.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
"The parties to an arbitration provision agree that they will be bound by the decision of
the arbitrators on the matters submitted for arbitration whether that decision determines
disputed questions of law or fact, and whether it is right or wrong." Canadian Indemnity
Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 709, 76 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1969) (quoting B.S.B.
Constr. Co. v. Rex Constr. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 327, 334, 19 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1962))
(emphasis added).
142. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 173, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618 (1986).
143. CAL. CIV. PROC, CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
144. The Meyer court flatly rejected this proposition raised by the respondent stating
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tential for abuse, the courts will become needlessly flooded with
petitions to compel arbitration of untimely substantive claims.
Finally, the language of California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1295 authorizes arbitration of any dispute as to professional
negligence. "Any dispute" includes disputes as to duty, breach,
cause, damages, and defenses. 145 Thus, in accepting arbitration as
a substitute for litigation, the parties are not giving up the right to
raise those disputes which they would be permitted to raise in a
court of law. 46 What they are giving up is the right to have those
disputes resolved in a court of law before a jury 47 and some dis-
covery provisions otherwise available in litigation . 4  Among those
disputes are affirmative defenses and among those defenses is the
statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims.
E. Waiver: The Only Defense Under the Present State of the
Law
The court is forbidden from denying a petition to compel arbi-
tration on the grounds that the underlying claim lacks substantive
merit.149 However, the court is not forbidden from, but rather is
permitted to deny the petition on the grounds that the statute of
limitations has run on the underlying claim where the doctor
raises the issue of waiver.'50 Waiver occurs when the patient has
that "[tihe statute of limitations applicable to a judicial action to compel arbitration should
not be dependent on how the claim for which arbitration is sought is characterized."
Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
145. "It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to
whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unautho-
rized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by
submission to arbitration as provided by California law. . . ." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
1295 (West 1982). See also Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 627, 208 Cal. Rptr.
676, 681 (1984) (an arbitration agreement extends to disputes involving punitive damages
pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294).
146. "As a substitute [to litigation], arbitration would not be encouraged by a deci-
sion which effectively holds a claim which may otherwise be asserted in a court of law may
not be asserted in arbitration." Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84.
147. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982).
148.
The [California] Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure sections 1283,
1283.05 and 1283.1 establishing procedures for discovery in arbitration proceed-
ings .... One of the primary objectives of arbitration is to effect expeditious and
economical solution of disputes. These objectives are accomplished in part by min-
imizing the formalities and trappings in arbitration which are adherent [sic] in
litigation .... [J]udicial interference in the form of ordering depositions in arbi-
tration proceedings is incompatible with the strong public policy in favor of set-
tling arbitrations speedily with a minimum of court interference. From this ration-
ale it does not follow that a proceeding in arbitration which is not an action for
purposes of discovery is not [otherwise] an action. . ..
Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84 (footnote and citation omitted).
149. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
150. Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 175, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619 (1986).
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unreasonably delayed the demand for arbitration.15'
Therefore, where the statute of limitations on the underlying
medical malpractice claim has indeed run, otherwise barring the
claim in a court of law, a doctor opposing a patient's petition to
compel arbitration must raise the issue of waiver. 52 If the arbitra-
tion agreement is silent as to a reasonable time within which the
patient may demand arbitration, the court is permitted to look to
the underlying medical malpractice statute of limitations to deter-
mine if demand was untimely (not to determine that the underly-
ing claim is barred) so as to constitute the patient's waiver of his
or her right to demand arbitration. 53
The best protective measure, of course, is to specify in the arbi-
tration agreement what constitutes a reasonable time within which
to demand arbitration and what constitutes waiver of that right. 5 4
The most reasonable way to accomplish this, being fair to both the
patient and the doctor, is to incorporate Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5, with the following alterations:
In an action for injury or death against a physician, based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time within
which to demand arbitration shall be three years after the date
of injury or one year after the patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,
whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time to demand ar-
bitration exceed three years unless tolled for any of the follow-
ing: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3)
the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or di-
agnostic purpose of effect, in the person of the injured person.
Any demand for arbitration made beyond the three year limita-
tion set forth above shall constitute a WAIVER of the patient's
right thereto.
Therefore, demanding arbitration would toll the statute of limi-
tations on the underlying claim so long as it was made within the
one-year or three-year time limit set forth in Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 340.5.
At this point it is helpful to review the pertinent facts in Meyer
with respect to the time sequence regarding the statute of limita-
tions. On April 25, 1978, Meyer underwent surgery at which time
the alleged injury occurred. This started the running of the medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations. On April 25, 1981, three
151. Id.
152. In Meyer, the trial court did not hear evidence on the issue of waiver, which is a
question of fact, but rather erroneously concluded that Code of Civil Procedure section
340.5 mandated a denial of the petition to compel arbitration. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at
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years later, the statute ran its course on Meyer's claim, barring it
at that point. In January 1983, Meyer finally discovered her in-
jury. However, she discovered it four and a half years after the
injury occurred. To look at it another way, she discovered the in-
jury one and a half years after the statute of limitations had run
its course. Lastly, and most importantly, Meyer demanded arbi-
tration in August 1983, more than five years after the injury oc-
curred and more than two years after the statute of limitations
had run its course on the medical malpractice claim.
Thus, the discovery of the injury and demand to arbitrate the
dispute as to that injury occurred after the statute of limitations
had already run. Meyer's claim was barred more than a year
before she discovered her injury and more than two years before
she demanded arbitration. Therefore, Meyer's "right" to demand
arbitration evaporated when the statute of limitations ran its
course on the claim.
Refusal of the demand to arbitrate constitutes breach of the ar-
bitration agreement which gives rise to a cause of action to peti-
tion the court to compel arbitration. 155 However, the arbitration
agreement was only valid in the event of an injury, and then valid
only for a maximum of three years thereafter. After three years
and no demand for arbitration, the agreement becomes void and
thus there is no right to demand arbitration. Therefore, refusal of
that demand does not constitute breach.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Waiver
The legislature should amend Code of Civil Procedure section
1281.2 to read as follows:
If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a
controversy exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may
not be refused on the ground that the petitioner's contentions
lack substantive merit but may be refused on the ground that
the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the peti-
tioner. Waiver shall be found to exist where the claim is barred
by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying sub-
stantive claim in that DEMAND to arbitrate was not made
within three years after the date of injury or one year after peti-
tioner discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no
event shall the time to demand arbitration exceed three years
unless tolled.
155. Id. at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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This alternative gives the trial court a bright line to determine
whether a petitioner has waived the right to demand arbitration,
rather than requiring it to look "by analogy" to Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 340.5.15.
B. Statute of Limitations
In the alternative, the Legislature should amend MICRA's ar-
bitration provision, Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, to read:
(a) In a claim for injury or death against a health care pro-
vider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence,
the time to demand arbitration shall be three years after the
date of injury or one year after the petitioner discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for
demanding arbitration exceed three years unless tolled.
First Option for Subsection (b);
(b) If demand is timely made pursuant to subsection (a)
above, and refused, the petitioner shall have four years from the
date of refusal to petition the court to compel arbitration.
Second Option for Subsection (b);
(b) If demand is timely made pursuant to subsection (a)
above, and refused, the petitioner shall have one year from the
date of refusal to petition the court to compel arbitration.
Under this alternative, there is a separate statute of limitations
specifically addressed to arbitration of a medical malpractice
claim. If the respondent urges that the statute of limitations has
run on the underlying claim, the court can resolve the issue with-
out having to determine the issue of waiver.
The first option for subsection (b) simply retains the four-year
contract statute of limitations157 with respect to petitioning the
court to compel arbitration. On the other hand, the second option
for subsection (b) reduces that time to one year so as to preserve
the time constraints of the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions while leaving a reasonable, albeit arbitrary, time within
which to petition the court to compel arbitration.
Without these clarifications, patients may be lulled into sitting
on meritorious claims believing that they have four years from the
time a doctor refuses a demand to arbitrate regardless of the date
156. Id. at 175, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
157. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
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of injury, only to realize that their claim is actually barred (if not
ultimately governed) by the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions. In addition, a chilling effect may befall doctors who, believ-
ing that patients have an extended (if not limitless) period of time
within which to demand arbitration of medical malpractice
claims, will refuse to sign arbitration agreements with their
patients.
CONCLUSION
The important issues giving impetus to MICRA's enactment
were not that patients be able or unable to sue doctors for medical
malpractice. Rather, the important issues were and still are the
"skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting ... break-
down of the health delivery system."' 158 What is important is im-
proving the quality of health care. MICRA addressed these issues
by imposing restrictions on medical malpractice lawsuits, includ-
ing time limitations.
Indeed, the court in Meyer acknowledged that its holding may
be undermining those time limitations,159 but it leaves the problem
unresolved. However, resolution of this issue is not the responsibil-
ity of the California courts, but rather the California Legislature.
Unless it was the intention of the legislature, it would be a stretch
of the imagination to conclude that the four-year statute of limita-
tions applies to the underlying medical malpractice claim. To
avoid further confusion and "contortion," only one statute of limi-
tations should govern and that necessarily is the shorter of the
two, i.e. the one applicable to the underlying claim. Even though
the underlying claim is not determinative of the applicable statute
of limitations to compel arbitration, it is determinative of the time
within which arbitration can be demanded as well as the final res-
olution of the case if the defendant is permitted to raise it as an
affirmative defense, 60 or in the form of waiver on the part of the
patient,'6 ' and does so successfully.
Once the petitioner demands arbitration within the medical
malpractice statute of limitations time period, it is up to the re-
spondent to either submit or refuse to submit to the demand for
arbitration. If the respondent refuses the demand, the arbitration
contract will have been breached at which time the petitioner's
cause of action to petition the court will accrue. 6 2
158. 2 1975 Cal. Stat. 4007, ch.2 § 12.5(l)(b).
159. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 175 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
160. Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
161. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 174-75, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
162. Id. at 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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It is then from the time the respondent refuses a timely demand
for arbitration that the petitioner has four years within which to
petition the court to compel arbitration. If the petitioner demands
arbitration of a claim that no longer exists, it is the same as de-
manding a claim that never was, and thus there never was any
"right" to demand arbitration.
Felicia R. Solito*
* Very special thanks, limited only by what words can say, to my father, Gil Lewis,
whose love, support, and confidence made this and much more possible.
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